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EXIT COSTS B A NEW PARADIGM FOR THE
TREATMENT OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS
OVER MATRIMONIAL PROPERTY REGIMES?
DAVID S. ROSETTENSTEIN *
I. Introduction
[To] assume a closed society is to make an abstraction which
takes us (conceptually) too far away from actual societies. The
significance of the state as a form of social order with the power
to open and close its borders . . . makes it tempting to assume
that societies can be divided along and distinguished using
national boundaries. But the world is not made up simply of
states, and borders are not always tightly sealed. People operate
across, and societies straddle, national boundaries.1
The empire driven vision of Anglo-American jurisprudence (more
accurately Anglo jurisprudence, since that is where the earlier
developments occurred) worked off an assumption that the only foreign
juridical activity worth acknowledging was that of sovereigns who had a
similar understanding of the role of the state.2 Accordingly, a domestic
forum would defer to consequences dictated by the foreign system unless,
in the domestic forum=s eyes, the result that the foreign system produced
was in fact unsatisfactory, in which case it could be dealt with by the
domestic forum on a public policy basis, or on the basis that the outcome in
fact was otherwise unacceptable to local law.3
* Carmen Tortora Professor of Law, Quinnipiac University School of Law
1. CHANDRAN KUKATHAS, THE LIBERAL ARCHIPELAGO: A THEORY OF DIVERSITY AND
FREEDOM (2003).
2. See JAMES FAWCETT & JANEEN M. CARRUTHERS, CHESHIRE, NORTH & FAWCETT
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 26 1301 (14th ed. 2008), [hereinafter CHESHIRE] (“[T]he
incidents of a right of a type recognized by English law acquired under the law of any
civilized country must be determined in accordance with the law under which the right is
acquired”) (quoting Dicey, CONFLICT OF LAWS, 43 (5th ed. 1932) (italics added)). English
law developments only really began in the last third of the 18th Century. Cheshire, supra at
21-3. Traditional political doctrine accepts the notion of a nation state with a political
authority whose role is to preserve the social unity of the state. See KUKATHAS, supra note
1, at 8, 15. In Kukathas’ view the mutual “respect showed by sovereigns reflects an
international community premised on tolerance.” Id. at 163.
3. American conflicts of laws jurisprudence might have felt that it had found a way
around these problems by mostly rejecting an Anglo “jurisdiction-selecting” approach which
focuses on picking the forum, not the content of what that forum does, in favor a “ruleselection” approach which focuses on the relative merits of the possible rules in the light of
the interests involved in case. But in the contemporary world both analyses ultimately lead
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However, today the pressures of globalization on one hand and the
increasing real global political power of foreign sovereigns on the other are
forcing domestic regimes to recognize that sovereignty. 4 At the same time
we have become painfully aware that the foreign state=s vision C for
example of the role of the state with respect to insular elements in their
societies, whether cultural, ethnic or religious C may differ radically from
our own. 5 Domestically, we are increasingly being forced to confront “the
question of whether the good society or a free society is, indeed, a closed
Because the system boundary tensions have become so
society.” 6
painfully obvious, and our premises for rejecting that which is foreign have
become increasingly suspect, we have started to see greater efforts to
identify a new matrix for engaging that which is foreign. 7 For example, can
us through the same process. These concerns drive us to do two things. First, we are
compelled to examine the legitimacy of our own domestic concerns, and then we are driven
to look at a number of aspects of the foreign activity: the acceptability of the foreign
sovereign=s political thesis; the engagement of this thesis with the relevant elements in its
society; and the ultimate impact of this engagement with the topic of our current concern,
namely the structuring of matrimonial property arrangements.
4. As is evidenced by an increase in non-hierarchical multi-nation international
institutions, such as the European Community. See KUKATHAS, supra note 1, at 26-8.
5. See Ann Laquer Estin, Embracing Tradition: Pluralism In American Family Law, 63
MD. L. REV. 540 (2004).
6. KUKATHAS, supra note 1, at 6. As Kukathas points out, there is also the possibility of
a debate about the content of a good society. Thus from one perspective such a society
might require a commitment to an underlying set of norms, such as those of social justice.
Kukathas does not see such an underlying commitment as essential to a good society.
Rather, in his view the society is “good” if, following individual moral evaluation, an
individual is willing to acquiesce to life in that society. Id. at 99-103. In his view the good
society is one imbued with a tradition of civility to difference, not an association with a
unique moral standing or vision of justice. Id. at 261. Beneath the surface lurks an anxiety
about the extent to which the established dominant political community has the associated
character of its “deep organization” put at risk by integrating dissenting competing legal
authorities B even when as a liberal tradition the community might like to tolerate the
dissenters. Id. at 192-93 (in part citing RONALD DWORKIN, LAW=S EMPIRE 214 (1986)).
7. See KUKATHAS, supra note 1, at 15, arguing for a departure from a traditional model
of freedom of choice in favor of a model of freedom of association, and away from a goal of
integrating that which is foreign into mainstream culture in favor of a system of political
indifference to cultural difference. Presumably this means an indifference to the property
consequences of those choices made by virtue of any cultural differences B at least beyond
the state=s own essential interests. Kukathas has no difficulty with a “liberal” society having
illiberal elements in it B in particular he notes the illiberal characteristics of many families.
Since, for him, the grounding value of liberalism is tolerance, this sort of social structure
presents no problems. Id. at 23-4. In the Kukathas= view the liberal vision demands
toleration not because it values autonomy, “but because it recognizes the importance of the
fact that people think differently, see the world differently, and are inclined to live B or even
think they must live B differently from the way others think they should.” Id. at 39. In the
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we find new principles that justify recognizing at least aspects of the
foreign conduct, beyond mere deference to a fellow sovereign? Even if the
foreign conduct involves recognizing values in ways or to ends that we
would not, is extending such recognition something that reasonable political
and jurisprudential theory would tolerate, at least under certain conditions?
At the same time, are there certain minimum conditions that in any event
must be met, no matter what?
Matrimonial property law provides an interesting and challenging
platform on which to examine some of these issues. In the not too distant
past a married couple=s property rights in Anglo-American jurisprudence
fell comfortably under the umbrella of the status regulating their
relationship. Moreover, this status, either as a matter of positive law, or as
a source of public policy, provided a reliable bulwark for confronting
foreign doctrine.
But now the bulwark is increasingly breached.
Frequently in the United States, but only recently in England and Wales,
recognition is being given to prenuptial agreements. This opens the door to
considering whether foreign activity engaged in by the parties (or possibly
their representatives) premised on Aagreement@ and Achoice@ and impacting
matrimonial property issues, should be accorded recognition by a domestic
forum. 8
This article seeks to provide a framework within which a conflicts of
laws analysis might be able to grapple with matrimonial property issues
arising from the parties= foreign connections. Mechanisms to do so
currently exist, but as will be seen, they are crude and problematic. The
inspiration for the proposed framework lies in political philosophy rather
than legal theory, for political philosophy recognized much earlier than the
law that the complex array of the world=s communities tends to demand a
refined and nuanced analysis.
The first substantive section of the paper briefly sets out the traditional
conflicts of laws scheme impacting the discussion, and introduces the role
of personal choice. In particular this section exposes the extent to which
public policy concerns of a domestic forum might start to destabilize the
parties= ability to rely on historical juridical activity. The next section
authors view, a society can be free even its members do not in fact make choices. Id. at 113.
Besides which, to not tolerate cultural differences opens the door to an accusation of cultural
imperialism. Id. at 191-92. In contrast, Barry takes the position that a state does not have to
tolerate “deep cultural diversity,” especially if doing so involves putting the force of the state
behind practices that repudiate liberal values such as freedom and equality. BRIAN BARRY,
CULTURE AND INEQUALITY: AN EGALITARIAN CRITIQUE OF MULTICULTURALISM 128 (2001).
8. See David S. Rosettenstein, Comity, Family Finances, Autonomy, and Transnational
Legal Regimes, 23 INT=L J.L. POL=Y & FAM., 192, 197-207 (2009).
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considers how, even if a domestic jurisdiction notionally is willing to defer
to foreign Achoices@, the possibility of different visions of Achoice@ that
might exist between foreign and domestic jurisdictions will further enhance
the instability of existing property arrangements. The third substantive
section then uses an analysis supplied by political theory to suggest a
principled way in which a domestic forum might rely on foreign choice
based activity and still reconcile that activity with its own public policy
concerns.
II. The Conflicts of Law Framework and Choice
Traditional conflicts of laws doctrine gives a forum state ample
opportunity to disrupt the property consequences that the parties to a
marriage might have anticipated ordinarily would flow from the union.
One of the leading English treatises on conflicts of laws, somewhat
exuberantly, has the following to say about prenuptial agreements and
conflicts of laws:
The contract continues to govern the proprietary rights of the
parties not only in the matrimonial domicile, but also in any
other domicile that may later be acquired. It must be recognized
no matter where it may be put into suit (subject to any overriding
provisions of the law of the forum) . . . . 9
However, as the classic aphorism goes, the devil is in the parentheses.
The English position just articulated, even though until very recently it
probably misstated the actual rule under English family law,10 mirrors the
position in the United States of the Restatement (First) of Conflicts of
Laws. Eleven or twelve states follow this approach.11 While the English
position provides a mechanism to avoid enforcing the law of the place of
contracting by conditioning the enforceability on the agreement=s not
9. CHESHIRE, supra note 2, at 1301.
10. See Radmacher v. Granatino, [2009] EWCA (Civ) 649, [2009] All E.R. (D) 31 (Eng.)
(replacing the historical rule that prenuptial agreements are void with an emerging rule that
prenuptial agreements will be binding if certain conditions are met). These agreements may
now become more enforceable on a routine basis. See id. A report of the English Law
Reform Commission on the enforceability of prenuptial agreements will follow the release
of the Supreme Court decision according to a private communication with the Commissioner
responsible for the report, Cambridge, May 2010.
11. Julia Halloran McLaughlin, Premarital Agreements and Choice of Law: AOne, Two,
Three, Baby You and Me@, 72 MO. L. REV. 793, 800 n.41 (2007); Symeon C. Symeonides,
Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2009: Twenty-Third Annual Survey, 58 AM. J.
COMP. L. 227, 232 (2010).
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conflicting with overriding provisions of the forum=s law, the First
Restatement=s escape hatch excuses enforcement where to do so would
offend the fundamental public policy of the forum.12 A comment to the
Restatement=s public policy exception states that mere difference between
the laws will not make a (chosen) law contrary to the forum=s policy.13 In
any event, the upshot of this approach is that the stability of the premarital
arrangement relies on the unstable boundaries of the public policy
exception.
The Second Restatement=s14 approach has been subjected to a variety of
analyses. Under one, if there is a true conflict, wherein more than one state
has a legitimate interest in applying its own policy, the forum=s policy
applies as a default.15 Others have called for a more nuanced approach.
The relative strength and importance of the policies should be evaluated.16
This requires a normative decision as to which state=s policy ox more
appropriately is gored. And how should one decide that? The Leflar
refinements called for balancing the concerns of predictability of results,
maintenance of international order, simplification of the judicial process,
advancing the forum government=s interests, and the application of Athe
better law@ approach B that is relying on the law that is more effective, more
modern and more just.17 The drafters of the Restatement (Second) picked
up these threads (with the exception of the better law approach) and added
concerns for the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative
interests of those states, the protection of justified expectations and the
basic policies underlying a particular field of law.18
Whichever of these analyses a jurisdiction adopts, the effect is that
choices that parties may make, or may be assumed to have made, are
12. McLaughlin, supra note 11, at 803-04.
13. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS ' 612 (1934), cmt. b. Needless to say,
in the absence of this position, either a conflicts approach is unnecessary, or the entire
analysis would always collapse under the weight of the exception.
14. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS ' 6 (1989).
15. McLaughlin, supra note 11, at 805.
16. Id. at 806.
17. Id. at 805-06; see ROBERT A. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW 479 (3d ed. 1977),
where the author, discussing Wyatt v. Fulrath, 211 N.E. 2d 637 (N.Y. 1965), is of the
opinion that New York law regulating a spouse=s rights of survivorship in a bank account in
that state should take precedence over the law of their domicile, Spain. The author thought
that the application of New York law was justified because it represented “a more modern
and enlightened social policy than did Spain=s medieval rule@ which imposed a community
property regime. Of course, the contemporary California community property system dates
back to the Visigoths!
18. McLaughlin, supra note 11, at 807-08.
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subject to reappraisal. Contemporary analyses do provide the parties with
some opportunity to entrench their choices. They may attempt a choice of
law. According to the Restatement (Second) that chosen law is to be
applied if directly relevant, as well as when that is not the case, unless the
designated state law has no substantial relationship to the parties or the
transaction and there is no reasonable basis for the parties= choice, or
application of the chosen state law would be contrary to a fundamental
policy of a state which has a materially greater interest than the chosen state
in the determination of the issue, and which in the Restatement=s view
would be the appropriate set of laws in the absence of the parties= choice.19
The above framework relates both to those situations where the parties
expressly have made an attempt to regulate their matrimonial property
arrangements, and to those situations where the parties make choices
implicitly, such as where the act of marriage imports a matrimonial
Aregime@ which supplies a framework for the regulation of financial
matters.20
The next section considers some aspects of state concerns regarding the
efficacy of matrimonial property choices exercised elsewhere.
III. Choice B Foreign Versus Domestic Visions of Choice
In reality, the possibility of exercising a choice potentially occurs at a
variety of different points. First there is the consent to marry. In some
instances this itself imports a regime that dictates an outcome. A second
possibility is that matrimonial property consequences, to a greater or lesser
extent, may be regulated by agreement. In this regard, the parties may be
able to regulate both the process by which the agreement is entered into as
well as the consequences. On the other hand, while the process may be
accepted by the parties, the actual outcome may not embody their wishes,
except by implication.
Some examples may be helpful. If a couple in South Africa agrees to a
civil marriage, without doing more, the marriage itself (at least if the parties

19. Id. at 808-09.
20. Thus, as to movables, under English law, the law of domicile at the time of marriage
controls, and as to immovables, it is the law of the jurisdiction in which the property is
located that applies. While English law might allow a doctrine of mutability, that is that the
controlling law may change, with respect to movables acquired subsequently elsewhere, by
way of contrast the French vision is one of immutability. See CHESHIRE, supra note 2, at
1297-1301. The American vision is considerably more opaque. See J. Thomas Oldham,
What If the Beckhams Move to L.A. and Divorce? Marital Property Rights of Mobile
Spouses when They Divorce in the United States, 42 FAM. L. Q. 263 (2008).
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are domiciliaries of South Africa) automatically triggers a universal
community of property regime. However, by agreement in advance of the
marriage, the parties can opt for a separate property regime.21 In the
Islamic tradition the consent to marry may be actual, or, for example, may
be in the form of an implied or imputed authorization of a guardian.
Indeed, in some instances, the woman=s consent may not be necessary at
all.22 In this tradition the consent to marry will import a separate property
regime, possibly moderated by a marriage agreement, the terms of which
may reflect the negotiations between the parties= families, or they may be
imported by custom.23 In these examples, as in America, the parties make
Achoices@. But whether there is a valid Achoice@ is determined by each
evaluating jurisdiction=s own reference framework.
From our point of view, the state=s policies, however they are formulated,
are going to be concerned with two aspects of these choices. First, the state
will be concerned with the substantive result produced by these choices.
An earlier paper suggested that the state=s legitimate interests in substantive
outcomes should be restricted to the state=s own interests, for example as
the social support provider of last resort.24 But a state may have concerns
relating to the process itself by which any choices were made. In America,
for example, a procedural fairness evaluation is a routine part of the
analysis of the acceptability of a prenuptial agreement.25
Choice involves at least two elements B the process by which the choice
is exercised and the values that presumably are weighed in making that
choice.
Domestically, when we look at the process of choosing, such as in the
context of prenuptial agreements, we strive to normalize both the process
and the values. Accordingly, as to the process, we take a hard look at
pressures influencing choice and try to neutralize them according to our
21. D. S. P. CRONJE´ & JACQUELINE HEATON, SOUTH AFRICAN FAMILY LAW 69-71 (2d ed.
2004).
22. DAVID PEARL & WERNER MENSKI, MUSLIM FAMILY LAW 142-3 (3d ed. 1998). But in
England, Wales, and Northern Ireland, see the Forced Marriage (Civil Protection) Act 2007,
2007, c. 20, and Ministry of Justice, Forced Marriage (Civil Protection) Act 2007, Guidance
for Local Authorities as Relevant Third Party and Information Relevant to Multi-agency
Partnership Working 5 (Oct. 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov.uk/guidance/docs/
forced-marriage.pdf (“[F]orced marriage is not the same as an arranged marriage. In an
arranged marriage, both spouses can choose whether or not to accept the arrangement. In
forced marriage, one or both spouses do not . . . consent to the marriage and duress is
involved.@).
23. PEARL & MENSKI, supra note 22, at 180.
24. See Rosettenstein, supra note 8, at 203-07.
25. Unif. Premarital Agreement Act ' 6 (1983).
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own perceptions of what it takes to effect that neutralization. Thus, we may
require independent representation, a time for reflection, and freedom from
social pressures such as those induced by waiting wedding guests watching
the ice statue melt. Substantively, we seek to inform the participants both
as to their rights and the actual material consequences of those rights.26
The challenge is to decide to what extent the legally normative elements
we employ to evaluate the efficacy of choices made domestically are
appropriately applied to Aforeign@ choices. Of course analytical angst can
be avoided in those instances where the substantive outcome produced by
the parties= foreign choice is acceptable relative to the state=s domestic
interest benchmark, whatever that may be. In short, the domestic
jurisdiction might not heavily scrutinize the choice if the outcome is
acceptable to the forum, even if, were the usual analysis applied to the
process, the outcome would not be found to be the product of a valid
choice.27 Such an approach is consistent with a view that the forum should
not use its public policy concerns, reflecting the entire swathe of domestic
law, to overwhelm foreign legal activity.28 But in other instances a concern
for validly exercised choices can and in some instances does trigger an
analysis of the process. Thus, where the substantive outcomes are
considered inappropriate, in some U.S. jurisdictions this triggers a
presumption of inadequate disclosure, which in turn lays the foundation for
the impeachment of a prenuptial agreement.29 Invoking a concern for
process to the end of making what the forum considers to be adequate
provision for the individual is an easily understood example. But beyond
the issue of inadequate provision, there is the question of whether the
consequences of foreign processes should be impeached just because the
process does not conform with the process norms of the domestic
26. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
' 7.04, and associated reporter=s notes (2002).
27. The conceptualization of Achoice@ can be problematic. Is it permissible to consider an
individual to have acted autonomously, that is to have made choices, if that individual is
unaware of any alternatives. Thus, should we be saddling someone with the consequences
of Achoice@ made by implication if that individual has lived in cultural isolation? See
KUKATHAS, supra note 1, at 113. Of course, rejecting a choice by implication, opens the
door to a choice by imposition, that is determining the outcome on the basis of what the
domestic forum considers appropriate, which might be the choice the party might have made
had he or she been better informed (the Romans did this with dos contracts, importing terms
that might have been included if the agreement had been drafted by the best jurists. CODE
JUST. 5.13.1d, c.), or a result that is considered appropriate in that jurisdiction, regardless of
whether or not it is premised on choice.
28. CHESHIRE, supra note 2, at 140-42.
29. See Matter of Estate Benker, 331 N.W.2d 193 (Mich. 1982).
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jurisdiction.30 For example, are family to family marriage contracts never
acceptable? That is, does the state=s moral/paternalistic vision generate an
obligation to inquire into the foreign process as such, regardless of what
outcome it produced? Essentially, does, or should, the jurisdiction see a
foreign process as inherently unacceptable, unless the contrary is
demonstrated judged by domestic standards? Judge Cardozo (as he then
was) set out the analytical tension this way:
The courts are not free to refuse to enforce a foreign right at the
pleasure of the judges, to suit the individual notion of
expediency or fairness. They do not close their doors unless
help would violate some fundamental principle of justice, some
prevalent conception of good morals, some deep-rooted tradition
of the common weal. 31
One view is that it does not matter whether the process by which the
foreign choice is made is culturally normative and contextually sound B the
only relevant standards are our own. This premise was spawned in the age
of empire. It is an approach which says Awe know what is good for us and
the same is good for you. Our standards will be enforced no matter how
socially dislocating the consequences are for you or your family.@
Alternatively, we could accept the consequences of culturally normative
choices, at least as to the acceptability of the process,32 while we test the
substance against, for example, the state=s minimal interest standard.
Implicit in selecting between these models is our willingness to defer to the
matrimonial property arrangements flowing from the foreign choice
structure. If the foreign sovereign accommodates, or even demands, a
family-controlled, gender-biased structure that is culturally normative,
30. In essence we end up treating that which is foreign as legitimate, even if it is
different. The underlying problem is that we become challenged to find a basis for doing so.
See KUKATHAS, supra note 1, at 5.
31. Loucks v. Standard Oil, 120 N.E. 198, 202 (N.Y. 1918).
32. Presumably, Anglo-American jurisprudence accepts social and legal consequences
flowing from social and legal processes that meet certain minimum standards. Thus, in
drafting the Forced Marriage (Civil Protection) Act 2007, 2007 c. 20, the English Parliament
sought to balance on the tight rope separating Aforced@ marriages from Aarranged@ marriages.
The latter are not subject to the protection orders provided for in the Act. See Forced
Marriage (Civil Protection) Bill, 2006-07, HL Bill [129], Research Paper 07/56, 34 (June 28,
2007), available at http://www.parliament. uk/briefing-papers/RP07-56.pdf. Kukathas= view
is that a Aminority@ community might be able to live according to its own customs within the
community, but cannot expect the wider society to enforce the minority=s norms against a
dissenting individual. This would apply to the consequences of customary marriages as
well. KUKATHAS, supra note 1, at 144-45.
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when should we not defer to such an arrangement? Or, in a nutshell, why
are the values appropriate to our society also appropriate for their
society? 135
The overarching challenge is the extent to which we, in an environment
sensitive to difference, are willing to accommodate that difference. At first
blush, that is what the traditional models of conflicts of laws appear to do.
Notionally, the domestic forum delegates to the foreign jurisdiction
responsibility for determining the authoritativeness of juridical acts
occurring there. However, because of the broad swath carved by public
policy exceptions or contrary law doctrines outlined earlier, the extent of
what appears to be a delegation of authority is at best limited, and in any
event produces a legal framework of great instability. Philosophically, the
concept of deference to others is hugely appealing, not just as an
acknowledgment of autonomy but also as an acknowledgment of
knowledge.
Better a choice by those informed of their actual
circumstances34 than an imposed domestic outcome which may be more or
less relevant, even if through the eyes of the imposing regime the imposed
choice is, on a generic basis, an appropriate choice.
33. One vision of liberalism is that it Ais an account of how different moral standards may
coexist rather than a set of substantive moral commitments by which all communities should
be required to abide.@ KUKATHAS, supra note 1, at 30. The underlying issue is the extent to
which a liberal society should tolerate or facilitate the ability of minority social elements to
exercise meaningful choices in the context of their own societal cultures, and, indeed for our
purposes, whether this option should be available to immigrant communities. See
KUKATHAS, supra note 1, at 11-15 (discussing WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL
CITIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL THEORY OF MINORITY RIGHTS (1995)). Even if we deny immigrants
this option once off the boat, we still have to decide on the acceptability and viability of
historically exercised choices. Invalidation of these essentially are at the root of the doctrine
of total mutability in the conflicts of laws analysis of family property arrangements. After
all, if upon migration all the participants had abandoned the position achieved by the original
choice there would be no dispute! Additionally, lest we lose sight of this fact, because of the
potential for broader family involvement, some of the key players may not be the migrants.
34. This proposition need not necessarily be true, especially if the choices made are
entities remote from the individuals affected by those choices. Thus, for example, one
analysis argues that the family laws and practices in Muslim countries and communities
were developed by classical jurists in different historical, social and economic contexts.
These doctrines then merged with colonial influences and negative aspects of local customs.
These evolved hybrid laws, it is argued, are now implemented by executive and legislative
bodies that have neither the legitimacy nor the inclination to challenge pre-modern
interpretations of Sharia, even if they are out of touch with changing political and social
realities. See Musawah Statement on the Proposed CEDAW General Recommendation on
the Economic Consequences of Marriage and Dissolution (Aug. 4, 2009), available at
http://www.musawah.org/docs/statements/Musawah-CEDAWStatement-2009-08-04.pdf.
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Could we do better? One very appealing model, at least in the context of
family law, is proposed by Eekelaar.35 He suggests that we respect choices
made by Athe family@. In essence what would be respected by a domestic
forum would be the Asovereign@ act of the foreign family, rather than the
sovereign act of a foreign sovereign B as where the property consequences
flow from the marriage status. A particular advantage of this structure is
that it localizes acceptable activity to a zone in which that activity is more
likely to reflect personal autonomy,36 at least as that foreign family
understands the concept of autonomy. That is, this approach allows the
domestic forum to subordinate its less than absolutely compelling policy
concerns to the choices of the foreign family,37 without opening itself up to
a scenario where the domestic sovereign=s concerns are seen to be being
trampled on by the foreign sovereign itself. A state and its domestic
policies might not be perceived as threatened by the activities of an entity
of less significance than a foreign sovereign.
But can the foreign family=s autonomous acts be trusted, at least vis-a-vis
the individual family member? Eekelaar=s view, correctly, is Anot entirely@.
He would limit the extent of recognition granted to the foreign family=s
choices to those instances where the foreign activity does not violate the
human rights of the individual family members.38
American family jurisprudence has some experience with a delegation
type model that is beyond the traditional constitutional law doctrine that
throws up a zone of privacy around the Afamily@, while still according
individuals within that zone varying measures of constitutional protection.

35. J. M. Eekelaar, Family Solidarity and Social Solidarity, paper presented at the
International Society on Family Law regional conference, Universidade Catolica Portuguesa,
Porto, Portugal, September 2009.
36. This would be seen as a virtue of the system if the vision of liberalism was one which
sees tolerance as the vehicle for allowing individuals the ability to Aassess and potentially
revise their existing ends@. KUKATHAS, supra note 1, at 36 (discussing WILL KYMLICKA,
supra note 32, at 158).
37. This approach would seem to be compatible with a “liberal” tradition. See BARRY,
supra note 7, at 123.
38. In any social model the position of children presents a particular challenge, since they
have limited ability to act autonomously, and limited power to exit any association. Nor can
the position of children be considered to be analogous to that of voluntary immigrants.
Deferring to the decisions of the family, subject to a check against human rights standards, is
one way of attempting to grapple with this situation. KUKATHAS, supra note 1, at 147. In
essence a human rights standard enables one to cross the boundary that Mill sought to
impose by consigning the family to the “private sphere” in which notions of liberty had no
place. Our contemporary understanding is probably different. See BARRY, supra note 7, at
130-31.
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The Indian Child Welfare Act39 delegates to tribal authorities the ability,
within tribal structures, to make choices regarding various matters relating
to Native American children.40 There are aspects of this arrangement that
are relevant to our present concerns. Who is a child covered by the Act is
partly a function of federal law and partly a function of tribal law. The Act
covers federally recognized tribes, but only applies to children who are
enrolled or are eligible to be enrolled as tribal members.41 Access to the
Abenefits@ of the Act is controlled by the choices of the Abeneficiaries.@
Eekelaar accepts this basic concept. The delegated-to family gets to define
itself. This has a certain appeal, for those most likely to be impacted by
what are culturally normative choices are those most likely to be
understood best by the social elements of that culture. But adopting this
model raises potential problems.
First, what if the domestic forum=s foreign Adelegate,@ Athe family@,
With
declines to recognize an individual as a Afamily@ member?42
American jurisprudence recharacterizing the family almost daily, does the
domestic jurisprudence defer to the foreign characterization, or ought there
to be limits on the extent of that deference, along the lines of the Eekelaar
boundary condition that the foreign activity should not violate human rights
norms? For example, what if the foreign family declined to recognize as a
member of the family an individual on the basis of that individual=s
religion, or lack of one?43 Does the domestic system then default to
traditional rules entirely, or would the domestic jurisdiction just import its
own characterization of the family for this purpose, but then Aenforce@ the
39. 25 U.S.C. '' 1901-63 (1978).
40. Id. ' 1903(1).
41. Id. '' 1903(8), 1903(4).
42. Indeed, in India under The Special Marriage Act, Act No. 43 of 1954, INDIA CODE
(1993), where a person professing the Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh, or Jaina religion marries
someone who is not of that religion, the Act affects a severance of the person of the named
religious profession from his or her undivided family. Id., '' 19, 21A. Interestingly, in
certain instances a “tribe, community, group, or family” by custom may identify someone as
eligible to be married within that entity, even if that individual falls within the prohibited
degrees for marriage under the general law. Id., ' 4. In short the social group can extend
inclusion to an individual who might otherwise be excluded.
43. For an example of how this type of problem can arise, see Malaysia Court Rejects
Hindu Bid, BBC NEWS (Dec. 27, 2007), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7161177.stm,
which describes efforts by a Hindu wife in Malaysia to block an attempt by her husband, a
recent convert to Islam, to divorce her in a Sharia court. Sharia courts have jurisdiction
when both parties are Muslim. Secular courts deal with non-Muslim matters. The
underlying problem is that demanding that autonomy be recognized involves a moral
commitment to a substantive value, which may or may not be implicit in any community=s
sense of justice. See KUKATHAS, supra note 1, at 3.
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foreign consequences applicable to a Afamily@ member? Neither of these
approaches seems a perfect solution. This, perhaps, highlights the fact that
unless the domestic forum is willing to restrict itself to recognizing the
choices of individuals as the ultimate benchmark, that is to defer to personal
autonomy,44 there are inevitably going to be problems of the potential
exclusion of individuals from what the domestic forum would consider to
be the appropriate foreign choice-making framework.45 And even relying
on personal choices may not be problem free.
Initially, there will be individuals who are subjected to the consequences
of a Achoice@ that they would prefer not to be saddled with.46 If under the
operative foreign law marriage is a status this situation may be
commonplace. Of course, domestic jurisdictions routinely adopt this
posture with respect to their own subjects. A tension arises because of the
question of whether the domestic forum should accept similar treatment by
a foreign jurisdiction. Or looking at the bigger picture, to what extent
should a domestic forum=s conflicts-of-laws posture be allowed to make it
impossible for the individual to Aescape@ the consequences of foreign
juridical acts, even if those consequences don=t reflect a party=s true choice?
A classic example of this situation is the South African case of Frankel=s
Estate v. The Master.47 Here, South Africa=s conflicts of laws analysis
subjected the deceased=s estate to the matrimonial regime imposed by
German law by virtue of the fact that it was the deceased=s domicile at the
time of the marriage, even though the couple had agreed at the time of the
marriage that they would settle permanently in South Africa and did so
within four months of the marriage. One of the judges in the court below
explained the roots of the controlling position this way:
[T]hat the property rights of the spouses are . . . governed by the
law of the husband=s domicile at the time of the marriage is
based upon the fact that the husband=s domicile is normally the
matrimonial home. Many principles of our law have a similar
basis in that they are founded upon the facts which exist in the
44. There is a clear distinction between a liberal tradition which makes autonomy
possible and a vision which contemplates state sponsored “inculcation” of autonomy.
BARRY, supra note 7, at 119-23.
45. As in circumstances like those described supra in note 43.
46. See Sharma v. Sharma, 667 P.2d 395 (Kan. App. 1983) (Plaintiff granted a divorce
notwithstanding the Hindu defendant=s religious objection).
47. 1950 (1) SA 220 (AD). If South African law applied, the marriage would have been
in community of property and the wife would have taken the estate free from estate tax.
German law established a separate property regime. The marriage was in 1933 and it seems
the husband left Germany because of the political environment.
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majority of cases. There is no reason in logic why the minority
of cases, where the facts do not exist, should be bound; that they
are bound is part of the tribute that logic pays to certainty. The
result is that the law is sometimes hard, but the alternative is that
it should be slippery.48
But legal consequences often are uncertain. The challenge is whether the
price of uncertainty is worth paying if the justification for doing so is to
recognize global complexity while preserving personal choice B at least
within limits. Specifically, how willing should a domestic forum be to
allow foreign activities to evade the consequences of regulated and
potentially restrictive foreign choices? A simplistic answer would allow
this escape if not to do so infringes on the public policy of the forum. This
model conceptually justifies allowing the escape in order to advance the
domestic sovereign=s own interests. The more difficult question is the
extent to which an exit from the foreign regime should be allowed as a
recognition of the foreign actor=s right to a broader range of choice.49
Traditional conflicts of laws doctrine would seem to be of some assistance.
For example, the public policy exception might justify rejection of an
agreement entered into under undue influence, duress, or coercion.50
But this proposition slides past the issue of the extent to which a foreign
process which is culturally apposite ought to be re-evaluated against the
domestic forum=s standard of coercion or undue influence, for example in
the context of a family-arranged marriage with an associated marriage
contract.51 And, how far should one peer into the abyss? Since in some
48. Per Broome, J., reported at 1950 (1) SA 221j.
49. Jane Perlez, Once Muslim, Now Christian and Caught in the Courts, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 24, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/24/world/asia/24malaysia.html?_r=1&
pagewanted=print (describing the efforts of a Malay woman who converted to Christianity to
marry a Christian fiancée). As a Malay, the Constitution of Malaysia deems her to be a
Muslim, and thus subject to the Sharia courts on issues relating to marriage, property and
divorce. Her problem arose because she sought official approval of a proposed marriage to a
Christian. The article points out that most converts do not seek official approval for their
marriages, and thus do not run into this difficulty. This raises the extent to which any such
marriage and its consequences would be recognized outside of Malaysia, absent official
recognition in the country.
50. CHESHIRE, supra note 2, at 143.
51. Indeed, it is possible to set up a vision of public policy in which a legitimate
“foreign” perspective could exercise a veto power over the domestic forum=s possibly
majority vision. Consider the following passage from the South African decision in Ryland
v. Edros 1997 (2) SA 690, at 707 G. The issue involved whether it would be contrary to
public policy to recognize contractual obligations flowing from a Muslim marriage that was
potentially polygamous. The court took the position that it would only be offensive to public
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cultures the marriage contract is an integral part of the marriage, can one
strike down the contract and leave the marriage intact? The potentially
broader social, and perhaps legal, ramifications of such a step, even where
the parties now are linked to a new jurisdiction, would tend to suggest that
caution is called for.52
What the above analysis suggests is that conventional conflicts of laws
treatments, in one respect or other, tend to provide a less-than-satisfactory
frameworks for deciding when it is appropriate to defer to the consequences
flowing from foreign Achoices@. As a result, the ramifications of the
historical arrangements tend to be highly uncertain.
The material that follows suggests another way of going about the
analysis, namely one that conceptually recognizes what was done, and then
deals with the consequences by allocating the costs of that earlier activity.
IV. A Political Theory Perspective on the Recognition of Foreign Choices
Legal theory takes the position that the consequences of foreign choices
should not be recognized when to do so would violate the public policy or
substantive law of the domestic forum. This tends to leave control of the
situation up to an ill-defined sledgehammer. This portion of the paper
looks to political theory to provide a more helpful analysis. The material
just set out suggests that deference should be accorded choice, especially
personal choice. A system advancing personal choice is inevitably to be
seen as more just, at least if we have the appropriate starting position.53

policy if it is “offensive to those values which are shared by the community at large, by all
right-thinking people in the community and not only by one section of it.” Id. Accordingly,
the contract claims flowing from a Muslim marriage contract could be enforced. Underlying
this type of analysis is the fundamental debate of whether an “authority” (located in a
cultural community, say, or elsewhere) is “legitimate.” And, indeed, whether any such
authority can ever be legitimate if it is not “just,” even assuming we can locate the roots of
justice. See KUKATHAS, supra note 1, at 259-60.
52. The Leflar view was that one can distinguish the status of the marriage itself, from
the incidents of the status. In his view the status emerges from the law of the parties=
domicile (a nice simplification in today=s universe) and the incidents of the marriage are
determined by local law. Accordingly, to use his example, following a polygamous
marriage in India, if the parties moved to Kansas, this would not terminate the marriage,
even if their cohabitation in Kansas was illegal B cohabitation in the author=s view being a
“usual” incident of marriage but not a “necessary” one. See LEFLAR, supra note 17, at 444.
53. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). A more refined analysis might want
to explore the ramifications for us of the difference that Rawls suggests exists between
choices in the political sphere and non-public identity choices. See KYMLICKA, supra note
32, at 160. That project has been left for another day.
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This would be the classic liberal analysis54. However, society is diverse.55
And sub-elements of society have different conceptions of justice.56 In this
environment, there are circumstances where culturally normative choices,
not necessarily made by the parties,57 nevertheless could be considered
acceptable to a domestic forum? One such a model is provided by
Kukathas.58 Starting from an assumption that the ultimate tenet of the good
society is freedom of association,59 he suggests that culturally normative
choices within a society are acceptable, even as to the individual, if the
system is premised on free association. Essentially, an individual subjected
to the consequences of community grounded choice structures should only
be bound by the consequences of those choices if he or she had the option
to leave the Aassociation@ C the community C but did not do so. This is the
exit principle.60
This model gives a domestic forum yet another way of looking at foreign
juridical activity. For such activity to be acceptable to the domestic forum,
the state’s own interests apart, the activity either should reflect the
consequences of personal autonomy, or where the consequences flow from
the choices of others, involve a scenario where the actors had the option to
exit the foreign legal framework but chose not to do so.61 In essence, then,
54. KUKATHAS, supra note 1, at 16-17 (discussing the “comprehensive” account by Kant
and Mills of the nature of good for individuals, encompassing among other values that of
personal autonomy, and contrasting that liberal vision with another which values an order
not “hostage” to any particular moral doctrine).
55. Kukathas argues that diversity is not the value that liberalism pursues, but the source
of a problem to which it offers a solution. Id. at 29, 32.
56. Id. at 6.
57. One perspective is that norms are the product of political societies with enduring
histories, and these political societies may be built by elites even against the wishes of many.
Id. at 35.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 5, 17, 93. The author sees the roots of freedom of association as being
a respect for liberty of conscience. Id. at 17. In his view, a good society need not be united by a
shared doctrine or some conception of justice. Id. at 38. Indeed, a hallmark of such a society is a
tolerance of those with whom its members disagree, even morally. Id. at 93. The author does not
see his vision as a communitarian one because it places no particular significance on the
community. Id. at 38. This perspective of the liberal tradition by no means owns the field. See
BARRY, supra note 7, at 119-23. In Barry=s view, the hallmarks of a liberal society are a principle of
equal freedom as is embodied in notions of civic equality, freedom of speech and religion, nondiscrimination, equal opportunity and the like. Id. at 123. However, as Barry has noted, protecting
the religious freedom of some opens the door to the secular deprivation of others. Id. at 167
(discussing the ability of religious entities to deny employment to some on the grounds of religious
difference).
60. KUKATHAS, supra note 1, at 143; BARRY, supra note 7, at 148.
61. Barry does not see necessary contradiction between a vision of liberalism that seeks
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an individual should be bound by choices made in the context of framework
provided by a particular community which the individual had the
opportunity to exit.62 As a corollary, the domestic forum should not
recognize the right of the foreign forum to deny the actor the right of exit,63
and this would include those scenarios where the foreign system generates
exit costs which cannot be borne without outside intervention.64 However,
this model does embody a challenging boundary condition. The model
accepts that a state need not always go along with an individual who asserts
a dissenting allegiance to another authority, because other issues intrude
such as claims of property, or third party effects of the dissenting
arrangement.65 This may be a challenge, because inevitably in matrimonial
property disputes that are of relevance to us, one of the individuals or the
groups affected by the possible solutions will be asserting a dissenting
position. What this implies is that vis-a-vis the domestic state=s own
interests a dissenting authority=s position would not be binding. But beyond
that the normal rules would apply.66 That is, original choices would be
binding so long as the exit option existed at the time the choice was made,
even if the jurisdiction in which the choices were made was ruled according
to Aquite illiberal principles@.67 Kukathas points out that both individuals
to foster autonomy and one whose central value is diversity or tolerance. He seeks to
overcome the tension between these two perspectives by developing a “liberal theory of
minority rights.” BARRY, supra note 7, at 146-54.
62. ANNE PHILLIPS, MULTICULTURALISM WITHOUT CULTURE 136 (2007). Phillips
identifies four questions associated with the right of exit. Is there anywhere for the person to
go? Does the person have the resources to leave? Is the cost of leaving too high? And,
because of cultural “drag,” can the individual ever conceive of going? Id. at 140. Making
an absolute correlation between the a failure to exit and a lack of agency is problematic. Id.
at 150. Given that we are concerned with the consequences for individuals who have left,
the primary concern for us is one of the identification of excessive or inappropriate costs, in
a context where one of the participants may not have exited, and where even the departing
party may be subject to residual social or cultural pressures B as where the matrimonial
property arrangements reflect the involvement of, and indeed contributions from, other
family members.
63. KUKATHAS, supra note 1, at 25, 37, 96. In Kukathas= view the underlying community
has no claim on the individual on the basis of kinship or culture. Id. at 96.
64. See BARRY, supra note 7, at 191-93 (discussing the ramifications for the Amish of
“choosing” to opt out of the Social Security and Medicare system).
65. KUKATHAS, supra note 1 at 25.
66. As Kukathas points out, in a liberal state government is not authoritative on the
question of what is an acceptable way for people to live, but it is authoritative on matters
having to do with the interests of the liberal state as such. Id. at 139 n. 57. This view may
be a little simplistic. Presumably, in a utilitarian model of liberalism, someone other than
the individual players is in a position to articulate what is in the collective good.
67. Id. at 31.
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enjoy the right to exit, which means that neither is in a position to demand
that the other stay, and in particular cannot do so by appealing to the
rightness of beliefs or standards of a community to which one party wishes
to remain attached.68 He also points out that this bilateral entitlement alone
cannot resolve claims of property and the like without consideration of
specific issues arising in particular cases.69 Ordinarily, what could well be
the key determinant in resolving underlying property issues arising from
prior choices would be that neither party chose to extricate himself or
herself from the system when the choice was made and the exit option was
available. The choice stands. Of course, there are going to be factually
close judgment calls as to whether the exit principle was satisfied in
scenarios where the relevant choices to a greater or lesser extent were those
of third party players. This framework represents the current analysis=
starting position.
Exercising the right to leave can have transaction costs. The question
arises as to whether the domestic state is justified in declining to recognize
choices made elsewhere because the choices made in the original
community cannot be considered free because the transaction costs of
leaving the original community are too high.70 While at some level such an
analysis is appealing, it involves the domestic forum assigning values to the
content of the cost-benefit analysis,71 which at best can be no more than
speculative. A modified approach which involves rejecting original choices
because avoiding them might have involved excessive transaction costs is
equally problematic B particularly since the cases confronting the domestic
forum are likely to involve parties who did at some point exercise a right of
exit. Somewhat ironically, these individuals are those for whom the
transaction costs of exit are likely to have been lowest. In either event, an
attempt by the domestic forum to invoke on behalf of the actor notions of
costs to the actor in justification of that actor=s apparent failure to exit the
choice structure, and thereby provide the domestic forum with an
opportunity to reject the consequences of any choices made, seems at least
misguided or paternalistic.72
68. Id. at 95.
69. Id. at 37.
70. Id. at 107.
71. BARRY, supra note 7, at 164 (discussing Jacob T. Levy, Classifying Cultural Rights,
in ETHNICITY AND GROUP RIGHTS 64 (Shapiro & Kymlicka, eds., 1997)).
72. KUKATHAS, supra note 1, at 107-08. This is a philosophical analog of impeaching a
prenuptial agreement on the basis that there was a procedural defect in the establishment of
the agreement, for example an inadequate disclosure of resources, with the result that the
forum is able to impose its own solution.
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Indeed we might move the descriptor from the class of Amisguided@ to
Adishonest@ if the goal behind invoking the costs is simply to advance the
domestic forum=s agenda in its own interests. In any event, there clearly
ought to be a distinction between rejection of the original arrangement in
toto73 because of concerns about cultural costs subverting party
autonomy,74 and attempting a more nuanced approach reflecting the
circumstances that ultimately emerged. Finally, in contexts where the
autonomy of earlier acts is open to dispute, we should bear in mind that one
of the participants wishes to rely on activity that was culturally normative,
whatever the demerits or otherwise of the relevant cultural pressures. To
what extent is it appropriate for the foreign domestic forum to saddle the
traditionalist with an outcome contrary to his wishes because the domestic
forum objects to the practices of his ancestors?
Among the exit costs experienced by an actor are the costs associated
with arriving in an unfamiliar jurisdiction. For example, historical human
capital investments may prove to have been inadequate or inappropriate.75
Clearly, this is a situation where the domestic forum=s own interests tend to
come to the fore. Language or employment skills may be incapable of
grounding economic viability. The domestic forum in such a context would
not be foreclosed from intervening to overturn foreign choices to the extent
that those choices effectively shift a financial burden onto the domestic
forum=s taxpayers and away from the party asserting a position based on
original choices. A foreign mahr provision76 should not burden domestic
citizens. But that is different from saying that the foreign mahr provision
should be overturned in favor of a financial outcome that might/would have
resulted if the choices originally had been exercised in the domestic
forum.77 The fact that foreign choices reflect foreign preferences based on
73. And why not the marriage itself, never mind the financial arrangements? See the
cases discussed in PHILLIPS, supra note 62, at 145-46.
74. See id. at 148-50.
75. BARRY, supra note 7, at 240; KUKATHAS, supra note 1, at 108; PHILLIPS, supra note
62, at 142, 147.
76. Mahr is a sum of money or other property that in the Islamic tradition is payable by
the husband for the benefit of the wife. The payment may be due on marriage or on the
occurrence of certain specified events such as death or divorce. Mahr is an integral and
essential incident of a marriage. The precise contours of the mahr obligation are open to
debate. See Pearl & Menski, supra note 22, at 190-201. Mahr is not dowry as AngloAmerican jurisprudence understands it to be.
77. To do so would allow the domestic forum to determine what kind of associations
individuals could form and maintain. KUKATHAS, supra note 1, at 111 (“If choices are to be
regarded as voluntary only if they are sound B because they are well-informed, or rational, or
not likely to lead to other ‘known’ unattractive consequences B then the way is open for all
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foreign conditioning78 does not justify the domestic forum imposing
outcomes grounded on its domestically conditioned preference structures,79
at least beyond that grounded on the forum state=s own needs.
A modified version of this analysis suggests that an exit should not be
burdened by any Aexcessive@ costs.80 Indeed, the original jurisdiction, by
imposing the costs would argue that they are not excessive81 and the
existence of universal standards regarding costs is at least debatable. The
problem is to identify the judge of excessiveness. An actor not leaving
might consider the cost of leaving excessive. On the other hand, the appeal
of staying might just outweigh the costs82 B there is no necessary qualitative
symmetry in what is being weighed. Indeed, it has been pointed out that
some of the costs associated with departure potentially are not amenable to
secular abatement (for example excommunication).83
For our purposes we probably can identify three sets of costs to consider.
The first are emotional/spiritual costs associated with leaving the prior
arrangement. These ordinarily would not be the concern of a domestic
legal regime. The second are those costs representing losses flowing from
no longer being associated with the original arrangement, for example
losing access to traditional family resources. One vision suggests that these
are exit costs which it is Alegitimate@ for the originating regime to impose in
the sense that they emerge from activities that a liberal state would find
acceptable, and thus it would be inappropriate for the new forum to seek to
abate them.84 This category would remain regulated by the original regime.
The third are potential costs flowing from risks generated by the original
arrangement, and which it was understood, expressly or implicitly, at the
time the arrangement was made might materialize on departure, that is if a
kinds of individual wishes to be denied. . .” ). Also, particularizing another general
argument advanced by Kukathas, secessionists cannot claim that exercising a right of exit
necessarily entitles them to withdraw specific property as well. See id. at 205. Or, from
another perspective, the receiving community does not open itself up to an argument that it
is “luring” exiting parties away, that is, that it is opening the door to forum shopping.
78. See id. at 109.
79. To state the proposition this way just highlights the inappropriateness of doing so.
80. BARRY, supra note 7, at 150; PHILLIPS, supra note 62, at 147.
81. See KUKATHAS supra note 1, at 115-16.
82. BARRY, supra note 7, at 243.
83. Id. at 150-51, 163-64. Barry, in a broader analysis than that considered here,
identifies three classes of costs: intrinsic costs C those that the state in the nature of things
cannot abate; associative costs C those costs imposed by the original regime which a liberal
state would permit to be imposed; and external costs C those which the controlling regime
should at least try to abate, even if it a cannot prevent them. Id. at 150.
84. Id. at 128, 150-53.
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party exercised the right of exit. These costs would be amenable to
abatement by the domestic regime.
In an environment where the premise of the analysis is voluntary
choice85 it would seem to be appropriate to insist that the risks of this last
class of departure costs should be shared, at least in the context of a joint
undertaking such as marriage. As Phillips correctly points out, identifying
Aexcessive@ costs really involves quantifying fair solutions in a particular
context.86 So, a traditional Islamic marriage in a foreign jurisdiction
accompanied by a marriage contract establishing a separate property regime
but making provision for the payment of a mahr, would result in the
agreement being enforced as within the second category of costs. However,
if the domestic role for the wife envisaged by the original understanding
would with time produce human capital losses which would be realized
when the marriage failed in a foreign jurisdiction, the foreign jurisdiction
would be entitled to address these costs, as exit costs, notwithstanding the
agreement. This approach would acknowledge the Arelational@ character of
the understanding. It is the relational character of marriage, too, that
preserves the right of exit during the marriage=s subsistence. All these cost
concerns would be apart from a domestic jurisdiction=s ability to insist that
at a minimum the demands of the state in its own right would have to be
met.
The premise of the analysis is of an award based on an implicit
agreement to share the risks of one party=s exit. However, if the
conceptualization of the situation is one that, by virtue of what happened in
the foreign jurisdiction, sees the costs of exit that do arise as being
inappropriate, then the characterization of the award moves to one of
Acompensation@87 and arguably, the party remaining behind should be liable
for the entire cost. At the root of this distinction are two different visions of
what liberalism demands. If liberalism requires tolerance of illiberal
conduct, then costs associated with such conduct are acceptable and the
premise for allocating those costs must rest on an Aagreement@ between the
parties. If on the other hand the liberal tradition denies the ability of other
groups to reject liberal safeguards for individuals, then costs originating
85. The object for the purposes of our analysis is to devise a scheme in which the
domestic system recognizes the parties= voluntary foreign activities, while drawing the line
at providing its own political power to establish the norms of an illiberal foreign regime. See
id. at 150. Barry accepts that religious association may reflect an imperative rather than a
“choice,” but still sees the association as voluntary as long as no illegitimate costs are
imposed on those exiting. Id. at 158-59.
86. PHILLIPS, supra note 62, at 146-47.
87. See id. at 148.
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with such a rejection are not legitimate, and can be awarded against a nonexiting party who seeks to rely on the original behavioral standards.88
Of course, one view might be that Athe liberal principle underlying
freedom not to associate has to be formulated so as to guarantee that its
exercise should be costless.@89 This idea would suggest that it would be
appropriate for a domestic forum to impose an outcome that would have
resulted if the foreign transaction had occurred in the domestic jurisdiction
at the time when that jurisdiction first became relevant to the matter in
dispute.90 A balanced response to this complaint would seem to be that
activity conducted in an environment with an appropriate exit principle
must contemplate the possibility of such an exit and thus implicitly assume
the risks of shouldering any negative costs associated with such exit,
presumably on no more than a pro-rata basis.91 This is really the basis for
the approach proposed in the previous paragraphs, except to the extent that
it acknowledges that there are certain classes of costs that the now domestic
forum cannot, or ought not to abate. Also, since the goal is to abate exit
costs, the domestic forum=s Asolution@ for the costs must be regulated by the
cost themselves, not the domestic forum=s vision of a generically acceptable
Asuitable@ outcome judged by the standards of its domestic cases covering
marriage failure.
In essence, the domestic forum=s role is to allocate the costs of exit
between the parties, and beyond that enforce the original agreement B the
domestic state=s own interests apart.92 This approach acknowledges the fact
88. See BARRY, supra note 7, at 131-32.
89. Id. at 154, 163 (rejecting this proposition).
90. Some would argue that it is not clear why it is legitimate to shift the costs in this way.
See KUKATHAS, supra note 1, at 112.
91. After all, the concept of an exit costless to both a departing party and the one that
remains is unachievable in the absence of some neutral compensation pool. See BARRY,
supra note 7, at 154; PHILLIPS, supra note 62, at 154. Phillips discusses the view of Ayelet
Shachar that an individual denied access to group resources, by being “defined out” by the
group, should be able to access resources from the state. PHILLIPS, supra note 62, at 154
(discussing Ayelet Shachar, The Puzzle of Interlocking Power Hierarchies: Sharing the
Pieces of Jurisdictional Authority, 35 HARV. C.R.BC.L. L. REV. 385, 422 (2000)). Shachar
seems to leave open the question of whether the “alternative jurisdiction” should be a source
of both procedural and substantive remedies. This raises the question of whether, where the
exit costs are a unique derivative of an association with religious or moral belief structures,
the exiting individual should only be treated as someone with “expensive tastes” and on that
account would have no claim to have those costs reimbursed from public funds. PHILLIPS,
supra note 62, at 40. The notion of a pro-rata apportionment applies to contexts where there
was a joint endeavor, such as marriage.
92. What this and the preceding paragraph are attempting to do is define the point at
which the liberal state=s possibly “benign neglect” should come to an end. See KUKATHAS,
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that it is difficult for cultural or other subgroups to maintain different
standards of justice when heavily engaged with a dominant community.
The dissenter emerging from the minority community is recognized by the
dominant community.93 The domestic state=s own interests can be
advanced, no matter what, because ordinarily new arrivals are voluntary
members of the new community and thus it is appropriate to impose
society=s norms on them.94 But in the present context the domestic state=s
norms contemplate enforcing the original Aunderstanding@ within
reasonable limits. The goal is to ensure that the exit costs do not reach a
level where the participant has no choice but to remain B in that
environment the arrangement would be involuntary.95
There is a legitimate concern that as far as exit theory is concerned, if we
look at the costs of exit in just money terms we will often undervalue the
psychological costs of exit. There is real difficulty in escaping the social
pressures associated with cultural affiliation.96 For our present concerns,
however, the issue is somewhat different. The individual(s) have exited.
The problem for us is the question of to what extent it is appropriate to
abate or modify the financial costs associated with that exit. The abatement
of psychological or social costs associated with exiting a cultural affiliation
is something that it is almost impossible for a legal regime to achieve.
Moreover, any refusal to abate financial costs because of a grand vision that
a refusal will induce individuals to remain in the original jurisdiction and
work for changes from within97 seems to be an open invitation for external
forces to sacrifice individuals on the altar of an inclination, however well
motivated, to modify cultures at odds with those of the domestic forum.98
supra note 1, at 236-37.
93. Id. at 144-45.
94. Id. at 162. Some circumspection may be required in this regard because first
generation immigrants may arrive on a less than voluntary basis. Id. at 163. Additionally, a
little care is required lest we end up with a scenario where we replace one system of
undesirable choices with another, the only advantage of the latter being that it is less
undesirable than the former. Put another way, we need to try to isolate what it is the exiting
party exited too and decide the extent to which the domestic jurisdiction can accommodate
the arrival=s preference structure.
95. See BARRY, supra note 7, at 152, 191-93.
96. PHILLIPS, supra note 62, at 137-39.
97. PHILLIPS, supra note 62, at 139-40, 150-54 (discussing AYELET SHACHAR, MULTICULTURAL JURISDICTIONS: CULTURAL DIFFERENCES AND WOMEN=S RIGHTS (2001)).
98. The existence of a right of exit puts the original community=s value system at risk.
KUKATHAS, supra note 1, at 104. To the extent that the new domestic system is willing to
defer to the original, the new system is entrenching the original. Indeed, this may be the
perspective underlying the respect which one sovereign shows for another. It is not the
merits of the system that are being recognized, it is just the system as such. But, since in
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Unfortunately for us, there are other ways of looking at the world. Thus,
it is possible to argue that if the foreign activity is rooted in an environment
which negates autonomy, that activity ought not to be respected. That is, it
is not the right to leave, or freedom of association, that is the critical value,
but rather freedom of choice.99 Accordingly, the argument goes, we should
look askance at societies that can be perceived as coercing or harming their
own members, even if the goal is to sustain a traditional way of life.100 The
challenge of this approach is that in order legitimately to reject the foreign
framework the criticism has to be grounded on a common standpoint of
morality.101 In the absence of that common frame of reference we just
endow domestic fora with the opportunity to reject the foreign activity in an
unconstrained manner B as the public policy doctrine and related analyses
currently allow them to do. At least if one accepts the conventional
Aliberal@ vision of a concern for autonomy, one appeal of the Eekelaar
model is that it isolates the family as a legitimate source of limitation on
any such autonomy. That is, the domestic forum can reject foreign activity
that was not autonomous, unless the family has signed off on that lack of
autonomy, and subject in the Eekelaar model to the participant=s human
rights not being violated.102 Reverting to the earlier analysis, exit costs
imposed by virtue of family decisions would be considered legitimate and
thus subsequently not recoverable in the domestic forum.
As far as the domestic state=s own interests are concerned, ordinarily it
would be appropriate to confine those interests to material values rather
than moral ones, lest the state=s liberal Avision@ for its community swallow
the value system on which any claim to be entitled to such a Avision@ is
grounded. There is a real risk that an effort to preserve choice subverts
concept all participants have a right of exit, the initial jurisdiction has no right to demand
from others that they recognize or enforce the original jurisdiction=s laws. Id. at 97.
Accordingly, for our analysis, the domestic forum=s responses are to be grounded in its
reference framework, not one with its roots in the original jurisdiction. At the other extreme,
the domestic reference framework is not obligated to facilitate the individual=s ability to shed
the old order. Id.
99. For a more detailed analysis of these two perspectives, see BARRY, supra note 7, at
118-23.
100. See KUKATHAS supra note 1, at 124-25 (discussing the work of JOSEPH RAZ, THE
MORALITY OF FREEDOM (1988); Deborah FitzMaurice, Autonomy as a Good: Liberalism,
Autonomy and Toleration, 1(1) J. POL. PHIL. 1 (1993); Will Kymlicka, The Rights of
Minority Cultures. Reply to Kukathas, 20(1) POL. THEORY 140 (1992)).
101. See id. at 125.
102. Of course, looked at through our present lens, if the “self-defining” “family”
includes adults, we might like them to be protected both by a human rights benchmark and a
right of exit.
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choice. Of course, this position is vulnerable to the argument that it
involves cultural relativism, and that to any true-blooded liberal,
liberalism=s standards are universal.103 Accordingly, a Aliberal@ state ought
never to recognize the consequences of foreign Ailliberal@ activity, unless
sovereignty trumps all. While as a matter of a philosophy governing the
behavior of nation-states or sub-units of such states this might be a worthy
position, the present paper is concerned with the treatment of people who
have acted on certain premises B morally just, or oppressive, or otherwise.
In such a context, the imposition of outcomes premised on the domestic
forum=s moral position opens the door to responses which vis-a-vis the
actors always may be considered to be arbitrary.104
Since the essence of a Kukathas type model is one envisaging the right of
the individual to repudiate a society,105 it would seem quite permissible to
argue that a change in country reflects such a repudiation. But it might not.
After all, if the individual vision to begin with is that the regulating norms
are supra-national, as where a personal law attaches on the basis of religion,
no inference immediately flows from a change in geographic location.136
The obvious contrary would be those instances where the individual took
up a new religion. Indeed, this exit might occur without a departure from
the original jurisdiction and then later be followed by a departure from that
jurisdiction. In a specific context what might have occurred is two discrete
exits, or only one. Thus the indicia of old order rejection will vary from
situation to situation. Our concern is the ramifications of the individual
exercising the right of exit, however the fact of that exercise is
demonstrated. Accordingly if the individual exercised a right of exit, but
remained in the original jurisdiction, this would be of no concern to our
notional Adomestic@ forum. However, if the parties do end up in a new
domestic forum, that forum may have to deal with the costs arising from
more than one exit.

103. See BARRY, supra note 7, at 136-38 (criticizing the work of Michael Walzer, The
Moral Understanding of States: A Response to Four Critics, 9 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 209 (1980),
and others).
104. Barry takes the position that “Political philosophy is not about what we may think it
would be nice for people to do but what, at any rate in principle, they can be made to do.”
Id. at 140. Barry is concerned with what people have done, while attempting to minimize
inappropriate “spillover” affects with respect to an activity in one group impacting other
groups. Id. at 141.
105. KUKATHAS, supra note 1, at 97.
106. Indeed, this point would be reinforced by the argument that culture cannot be
readily abandoned. PHILLIPS, supra note 62, at 13-35.
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Finally, where both individuals exercise the right of exit, a supportable
analysis is that from that point on the original regime would be replaced by
that of the new regime. The open question in such a context is whether the
prior arrangements should remain in force with respect assets in existence
at the time of exit, or whether they should be regulated by the new regime.
Even though there are powerful efficiency arguments, at least in the eyes of
the domestic forum, to justify total mutation, there would seem to be an
equally powerful case for applying the original rules to assets in hand
before the exit occurred. Not the least of these arguments is that
conceptions of culture and of the family, as they existed at the marriage=s
inception, may have been so different that imposing the new regime will be
unjust or unfair, especially if the group of original Aparticipants@ extends
beyond the parties themselves. That said, with the original arrangements at
least partly retained, there may still be exit costs to be dealt with.
Conceptually, the analysis would be as before, except to the extent that
displacing the old regime with the new has led to the abatement of some of
those costs B for example by a marriage dissolution award under the new
regime partially compensating for human capital losses arising from
choices made in the original jurisdiction.
V. Conclusion
Traditional conflicts of laws doctrine produces a highly unstable
platform for trying to determine whether foreign juridical activity aimed at
establishing property consequences attaching to a marriage and flowing
from choices of one sort or another will actually produce the anticipated
result. This is particularly so because the contexts in which choices are
made are highly varied, for cultural reasons, amongst others, so that the
outcome is likely to be uncertain when these choices are subjected to ex
post facto evaluation against a benchmark of domestic public policy and
positive law.
Accordingly, relying on political theory rather than traditional legal
doctrine, it is apposite for a liberal society to enforce the original
understanding, subject to certain limits. As to these limits, as a first order
of business, the domestic states own interests, as such, need to be protected.
Thereafter, on the premise that the original understanding of the actors
embodied a tacit acknowledgment of the rights of participants to exit the
original legal framework, the new jurisdiction is empowered to allocate the
costs associated with any such exit, except to the extent that the costs arise
from activities that in the ordinary course would be acceptable to a liberal
society. In those instances where the new jurisdiction considers the original
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choice to have been freely made, the recoverable exit costs will be shared.
Where the Achoice@ was not free, the exit costs will be borne by the party
choosing not to exercise the right to exit. In those instances where both
parties at some point exercised the right to exit, the original understanding
will control the consequences up until the point of mutual exit, and
thereafter the new jurisdiction=s rules will control. Mere physical relocation
itself will not necessarily establish that the participants have exercised a
right of exit.
The suggested model seeks to avoid a new jurisdiction having to pass
judgment on what ordinarily will be the culturally normative behavior of
others. It also has the advantage of the domestic jurisdiction not imposing
consequences designed for domestic social behavior on relationships
grounded in what may be an entirely different cultural universe. The model
provides an opportunity for a domestic jurisdiction to display the wisdom of
acknowledging its own ignorance.
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